Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions

10-15-2007

Order (MARTIN D. MARCHMAN)
Elizabeth E. Long
Superior Court of Fulton County

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Institutional Repository Citation
Long, Elizabeth E., "Order (MARTIN D. MARCHMAN)" (2007). Georgia Business Court Opinions. 110.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/110

This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

COpy

o

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
MARTIN D. MARCHMAN,

)

) Civil Action No.: 2005CYIOI076
Plaintiff,

)

)

v.
JACK FISHER,

)
)
)

)

Defendant.

FILED IN OFFICE

OCT I I) 2007

)
MTON cOtJNi):vGiIvuu,

ORDER
This case is before the Business Court on a series of discovery-related issues. After
reviewing the record ofthe case, this Court finds as follows:
During the two years in which the case was pending before Judge Moore, numerous
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discovery disputes arose. On June \3, 2007, Judge Moore held a hearing on outstanding
discovery issues and issued an Order on August 27, 2007, which addressed several but not all of
the outstanding discovery issues.
On August 29, 2007, this case was transferred to the Business Court. During the initial
Case Management Conference, held on September 11, 2007, and a follow-up conference call on
September 24,2007, the parties provided the Court with their list of unresolved discovery issues.
There are five discovery-related issues that remain before this Court and shall be
addressed in this Order: (I) motions relating to memorandum from Defendant Jack E. Fisher to
his attomeyDonald Johnson, (2) motions relating to the subpoena of Donald Johnson, (3) Judge
Moore's August 27'h Order denying Plaintiff's Protective Order Motion, (4) Judge Moore's
August 27th Order regarding the in-camera inspection of discovery documents, and (5) Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel Production of Documents and for Other Discovery filed January 11, 2007.

o

1. Johnson Memo

Both parties agree that Defendant Jack E. Fisher's Motions to Compel, Seal, and Strike
filed on March 5th , 8t\ and 20 th , respectively, regarding a memorandum written for Donald
Johnson (hereinafter referred to as the "Johnson Memo"), are ripe for the Court's detennination.
The Johnson Memo was prepared by Defendant Fisher for Donald Johnson, who acted as
attorney for Defendant Fisher and several of his business ventures. The Johnson Memo
described the business relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant and some of the facts giving
rise to this lawsuit and was inadvertently produced during discovery.
In accordance with the attorney-client privilege, Defendant petitions the Court to require
Plaintiff to return or destroy all copies of the Johnson Memo and to prohibit its use in this case.
Plaintiff, however, asserts that the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
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authorizes his use of the Johnson Memo, which Plaintiff claims, directly contradicts Defendant's
under-oath deposition testimony and verified interrogatory responses. Marriott Corp. v.
American Academy of Psychotherapists. Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497 (1981).
In Marriott Corporation, defendants sued the hotel after their convention reservations
were cancelled. Shortly after the cancelled reservations, the hotel's sales director prepared a
memorandum for the in-house attorney in which the director described the events ofthe
cancelled reservations. The memorandum contradicted "certain elements of the director's
testimony at trial" and was admitted for impeachment purposes only. Id. at 50 I. Defendants
appealed the admission ofthe memorandum citing the attorney-client privilege. Id.
The attorney-client privilege "may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed,
but it can not be used as sword or weapon of offenses to enable persons to carry out contemplated
crimes against society, fraud or perjuries." rd. at 502 (declining to apply the crime/fraud
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exception, but upholding the admission of the memorandum on the grounds that the corporate
attorney-client privilege did not attach), citing, Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Goss, 50 Ga.
App. 637, 639 (1934).
The Johnson Memo at issue in this case was not written to shield a past crime or fi'aud, in
which case it would not be admitted under any circumstances. At this stage ofthe litigation,
Defendant's statements do not rise to the level of perjury or fraud upon the Court; however, if
Defendant testifies under oath in Court in a manner that directly contradicts the Johnson Memo,
then Plaintiff may move to admit the evidence for impeachment purposes only under the
crime/fraud exception.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Compel the Return or Destruction of the Privileged
Document, or, in the Alternative, for Protective Order to Prohibit the Use of Privileged
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Document or its Contents and for Sanctions,filed March 5, 2007, is hereby DENIED in part and
GRANTED in part. The Johnson Memo may be used, if at all, in the limited circumstances

where Defendant's in-Court testimony directly contradicts the memorandum and the Plaintiff
successfully raises a crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege for the purposes of
admitting the evidence for impeachment.
Similarly, and in accordance with the reasons stated above, Defendant Jack E. Fisher's
Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiffs Consolidated Response Brief Filed on or About March 5,
2007 and Attached Exhibits Thereto,jiled March 8, 2007, is hereby GRANTED. Defendant
Jack E. Fisher's Motion to StriRe Plaintiffs Consolidated Response Brief,jiled March 20,2007,
is hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Plaintiffs response shall be stricken of any
portion that relies upon the Johnson Memo.
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2. Johnson Deposition and Request to Produce
Similarly unresolved is Donald G. Johnson, Esq.'s Objections and Motion to Quash
Plaintiff's Subpoena for Deposition and Production of Documents and Motion for Protective
Order Under Rule 26(c) and Memorandum oflaw in Support, filed Janumy 29,2007. Because
the Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Defendant's counsel has been denied and the issue of the
Johnson Memo has been resolved as stated above, this Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to
Quash the Subpoena.
Under Judge Moore's August 27, 2007, Order the Court ordered an in-camera inspection
of certain documents requested by Plaintiffs from Internal Revenue Service and Bank of North
Georgia. Such further discovery and the ability of Plaintiff to obtain the needed documents

o

directly from the Defendant, persuades the Court to GRANT in part the Motion for Protective
Order. In the event, however, that Plaintiff needs additional damages-related discovery, not
otherwise produced or available but through Mr. Johnson, Plaintiff may so petition the Court
after a final ruling on the pending motion for summary judgment.
3. Judge Moore's August 27th Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order
In the August 27th Order, Judge Moore denied Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order.
Plaintiff petitioned this Court for clarification of the August 27th Order regarding the denial of
the Motion for Protective Order on the grounds that the number of discovery disputes in the case
made it unclear which motion was denied in that Order.
On January 17, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify, a Motion to Stay Discovery,
and a Motion for Protective Order citing a potential conflict of interest on behalf of Defendant' s

o

counsel. During the June 13, 2007, hearing before Judge Moore, which was the basis for Judge
Moore's August 27th Order, Plaintiff referred the Court to the group of three-related motions filed
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regarding counsel's potential conflict of interest. While the Plaintiff also argued other discovery
issues such as the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding financial documents from
third paliies, the disqualification issue was paramount in the hearing and in Judge Moore's
August 27th Order. After denying the Motion to Disqualify, Judge Moore wrote, "[llikewise,
based on the foregoing ruling, the Court finds there is little need to elaborate on Plaintiffs
Motion for Protective Order to the extent said motion was based upon the current motion to
disqualify counsel."
After reviewing the briefs on these motions, the transcript of the June 13,2007, hearing
before Judge Moore, and the August 27th Order, this Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for
Protective Order,filed January 17, 2006, was denied in Judge Moore's August 27th Order.

4. In-camera inspection of documents ordered in August 27th Order

C)

The August 27th Order addressed the discovery dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant,
which was embodied in a series of Defendant's Motions to Quash,jiled January 4, 11, 18, and

29,2007. The August 27th Order concluded that "any such discovery requested by Plaintiffto be
first submitted to the appropriate court for in camera inspection within sixty (60) days from the
date" ofthe Order. Plaintiff requested that this Court clarify the ruling and provide the parties
with direction on how to execute. The August 27th Order is clear that the third parties upon
whom discovery has been served shall be required to produce the requested documents, to be
reviewed by the court in-camera. Such discovery, however, largely goes to the issue of damages
and will be appropriately addressed by the Court after a final ruling on the pending motion for
summary judgment. At that time and in conjunction with its order on summary judgment, the

o

Court will provide further instructions for Defendant and the third parties ordered to produce
documents.
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S. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and for Other Discovery
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Other Discovery on
January II, 2007, seeking to obtain the tax returns, financial statements, and bank statements of
Defendant Fisher and certain of his business entities from 1997 through 2002. Such discovery
requests speak to damages valuation and shall be handled, as with the documents to be reviewed
in-camera, after this Court has issued a final ruling on the pending motion for summary
judgment.

SO ORDERED this / Q

_v,

day of October, 2007.
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IZABE HE. LONG, SENIOR JU ePE
Superior ourt of Fulton County
Atlanta J dicial Circuit
Copies to:
Rosemary S. Armstrong, Esq,
Joseph J. Burton, Jr., Esq.
BURTON & ARMSTRONG LLP
Two Ravinia Drive, Suite 1750
Atlanta, GA 30346
Kelley Amanda Lee, Esq,
John G. Perry, Esq.
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE PC
1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 3500
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
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